By examining Mahan's and Corbett's theories, the American Revolution, the Russo-Japanese War, and World War II, one can assert that the foremost purpose of sea power is in fact to secure the sea lines of communication, not winning naval battles. 36 This truism, which would be proven just two years later in the attritional horrors of the First World War, suggests that the United States should prioritize a force. Rather, only discussion and the academic process will deem spacepower theory of any use. But with such a qualitative approach, it is hard to declare success. Mahans emphasis on naval strategy meant that his theory suited an insular power on the geographic periphery much more than a power in the heart of a continent. While Mahan's theory that winning naval battles might be the quickest path to achieving one's goal of command of the sea, as history shows, it is simply one method of achieving that objective. Alfred Thayer Mahan wrote in 1912, as the preeminent naval strategist of his time, that force is never more operative than when it is known to exist but is not brandished. These two basic grounds of strategic analogy from warfare on Earth to outer space serve to illustrate how ‘Clausewitz in orbit’ works. Kuehn will discuss naval theory as it relates to Alfred Thayer Mahan, a naval officer and historian, who was considered one of the most influential strat. Turner (link) and naval strategist Alfred Thayer Mahan were instrumental in the countrys move toward foreign expansion, and writer Brooks Adams further. Corbett's theory, on the other hand, could be summarized as 'either to secure the command of the sea or to prevent the enemy from securing it.' (Corbett, 91) Corbett continues by specifying that, 'command of the sea, therefore, means nothing but the control of maritime communications or sea lines of communication (SLOCs), whether for commercial or military purposes.' (Corbett, 94) While their theories are by no means polar opposites, discussion continues to this day as to the best employment of a nation's navy. One could summarize Mahan's theory as the concentration of a nation's fleet in order to seek out and destroy the enemy fleet in a decisive naval battle. As Mahan published his writings nearly 20 years earlier than Corbett, his writings began as the more popular and influential of the two. 6 BAB 2 TINJAUAN PUSTAKA 2. ![]() ![]() They opportunely published their writings during the zenith of British power, which was built primarily upon the British Navy. Alfred Thayer Mahan and Sir Julian Corbett are viewed in many circles as the fathers of sea power theory and maritime theory. military historian and one of the most influential of all nineteenth-century historians, Alfred Thayer Mahan.
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